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world estate

FX Trade

  • FXチャート ブログパーツFX

資源貿易リンク

記事リスト①

  • 2010.1-10 記事リスト①
    中国の貿易政策と海外戦略 10/10/21 中国レア・アース危機への対応 10/10/21 中国との貿易交渉術 10/10/19 円高デフレと産業構造変化 10/10/18 日本と資源大国ロシアの石油産業 10/10/18 非資源国の石油調達戦略 10/10/15 日本の貿易政策;FTA協定(4) 10/10/11 日本の貿易政策:FTA協定(3) 10/10/11 日本の貿易政策:FTA協定(2) 10/10/11 日本の貿易政策:FTA協定(1) 10/10/11 日本貿易の生命線:輸出市場の転換点 10/10/06 日本の資源エネルギー貿易政策(3) 国際独占資本ロイヤルダッチシェルのアジア市場戦略 10/10/02 JETRO 海外調査部 中国市場開拓セミナー参加報告 10/09/09 (2)産業空洞化( de-industrialization )と貿易政策 10/09/07 貿易政策の使命:外需(外部経済)としての景気対策(1) 10/09/07 中国農民工の子弟と日本の大学教育 10/08/21 貿易の定義(教材) 10/06/26 拓殖大学大学院 商学研究科説明会  貿易論の講座内容 10/06/26 2010 国際商取引・貿易演習ゼミ 科目構成(武上ゼミ) 10/06/26 国際取引論の学問体系について 10/06/26 円高による輸出不振は日本産業の空洞化を招く 10/06/26 授業参考資料:日本石油産業転換点(6/23出典ダイヤモンド小島武志氏) 10/06/23 拓殖大学経営経理研究所 研究発表・研究紹介 2010.4. 10/06/23 日本経済のサービス化とサービス貿易の発展 10/06/23 日本と世界のエネルギー貿易(基礎ゼミ資料) 10/06/23 日本のエネルギー資源貿易政策(2)戦後石油産業生成期から見る貿易特性 10/06/23 定期考査・課題リポートの件 10/06/17 貿易論を学ぶ学徒へ:恒産なくして恒心あり 10/06/16 国際取引・貿易ゼミ 「卒業論文のテーマ設定について」 10/06/15 拓殖大学商学部 多国籍企業論 キーワード 講義メモ 2010/5 東洋経済新報社版 テキスト 第8章 独占と不完全競争 10/04/09 東洋経済新報社 テキスト 第9章 寡占経済 10/04/09 2010年度 商学部 国際取引・国際貿易論 講義要項 10/04/09 2010年度大学院商学研究科 講義要項 10/04/09 講義資料:中国・台湾貿易の特徴 (学内使用に限るJETRO HP出典資料より修正) 10/04/09 円高問題とデフレ経済 10/04/09 国際収支・対外負債勘定の急激な変化 2010 10/04/09 国際独占資本の市場支配 10/04/08 資源無き国の貿易政策 10/04/08 貿易通貨と円の起源 10/04/08 中国留学生へ 学問・資格 10/02/20 貿易理論 講座研究用資料 ダウンロード1 10/02/18 経済・貿易理論 第十五章 東洋経済新報社版 テキスト 10/02/17 経済・貿易理論 第十七章  10/02/17 経済・貿易理論 第一章 (東洋経済新報社版 オンラインテキスト)10/02/17 東アジア貿易の構造変化分析 10/01/22 Research & Development Management and Technology Transfer 10/01/20 一年生オリエンテーション講義 10/01/20 技術拡散と市場成果 10/01/20 経営戦略と市場行動 電子技術関連産業と製品市場構造 10/01/20 グローバルR&Dシステムの構築 10/01/20 MNCの内部化理論 10/01/20 市場成長と技術のプロフィール 10/01/20 自動車産業の貿易構造と産業内分業体制 10/01/20 国際技術移行モデル(事例分析) 10/01/20 技術革新と国際投資市場 10/01/20 プロダクトライフサイクル仮説と製品市場戦略 10/01/20 Product design and market strategy(3) 10/01/20 Strategic Information System & technical method of marketing simulation 10/01/20 国際市場と競争戦略 10/01/20 APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX SYSTEM 10/01/20 Analyses of Purchasing Behavior in the Artificial market & its agents 10/01/20 An analysis on product design(1) Characteristic of precision-optical-products market 10/01/20 An Analysis on Product Design (2) Market character of Precision optical products 10/01/20 INTERNATIONAL TRADE&TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 国際貿易と技術革新 10/01/20 Analysis on Information Technology and corporate strategy 10/01/20 国際取引論講義2009年度 案 10/01/20 研究の過去実績(2001年まで) 10/01/20 不完全市場の企業戦略 10/01/20 進路開拓と就職準備について 10/01/20 Structure of product market & corporate strategy(material) 10/01/20 国際取引論の学問体系 10/01/20 研究領域の紹介(武上ゼミ) 10/01/20 貿易の働き(講義資料) 10/01/20 拓殖大学大学院商学研究科のガイダンス 指導内容 10/01/20 日本のエネルギー資源貿易政策(3) 10/01/20 日本のエネルギー資源貿易政策(2) 10/01/20 日本のエネルギー資源貿易政策(1) 10/01/20 円高による輸出不振は日本産業の空洞化を招く 10/01/20 多国籍企業論の内容 10/01/20

燃料油脂新聞社

国際エネルギー機関 IEA

http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/

エクソン・モービル(スタンダードオイル)

Royal Dutch Shell ロイヤルダッチ・シェル

Pertonas ペトロナス (マレーシア)

GAZPROM ガスプロム(ロシア)

CNPC ペトロチャイナ

AGIP/ENI(イタリア)

Chevron(US)

PERTAMINA(プルタミナ・インドネシア)

k takegami

  • k takegami

石油動向:石油情報センター日本エネルギー経済研究所

JOGMEC:石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構

投稿リスト

  • 貿易関係 リンク・リスト
    JETRO http://www.jetro.go.jp/links/ 経済産業省 ‐外務省 資源エネルギー庁 税関総務省統計局、統計センター 環境省 . OECD日本政府代表部 ‐投資委員会「多国籍企業行動指針」 日本貿易保険 産業技術総合研究所 (財)国際経済交流  国立環境研究所 経済産業研究所 中小企業基盤整備機構 国際協力銀行(JBIC) 国際協力機構(JICA)科学技術振興機構 ‐サイエンスポータル国際観光振興機構(JNTO) 日本銀行 東京商工会議所 (社)日本経済団体連合会(社) 環日本海経済研究所(ERINA) 日本銀行金融研究所 日本商工会議所(財)経済広報センター..貿易・投資関係機関等(財)日本関税協会(財)国際貿易投資研究所(ITI)(財)対日貿易投資交流促進協会(MIPRO) (社)日本貿易会 (財)貿易研修センター日・欧産業協力センター日露貿易投資促進機構 (財)海外貿易開発協会 (財)海外技術者研修協会 (財)安全保障貿易情報センター(CISTEC) (社)日本通関業連合会貿易アドバイザー協会(AIBA)
  • 投稿リスト
    タイトル 技術拡散と市場成果 経営戦略と市場行動 電子技術関連産業と製品市場構造 グローバルR&Dシステムの構築 MNCの内部化理論 市場成長と技術のプロフィール 自動車産業の貿易構造と産業内分業体制 国際技術移行モデル(事例分析) 技術革新と国際投資市場 プロダクトライフサイクル仮説と製品市場戦略 Product design and market strategy(3) Strategic Information System & technical method of marketing simulation 国際市場と競争戦略 APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX SYSTEM Analyses of Purchasing Behavior in the Artificial market & its agents An analysis on product design(1) Characteristic of precision-optical-products market An Analysis on Product Design (2) Market character of Precision optical products INTERNATIONAL TRADE&TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 国際貿易と技術革新 Analysis on Information Technology and corporate strategy 国際取引論講義2009年度 案 1 研究の過去実績(2001年まで) 不完全市場の企業戦略 進路開拓と就職準備について Structure of product market & corporate strategy(material) 一年生オリエンテーション講義 国際取引論の学問体系 研究領域の紹介(武上ゼミ) 貿易の働き(講義資料) 拓殖大学大学院商学研究科のガイダンス 指導内容 日本のエネルギー資源貿易政策(3) 日本のエネルギー資源貿易政策(2) 日本のエネルギー資源貿易政策(1) 円高による輸出不振は日本産業の空洞化を招く 多国籍企業論の内容

DOE:アメリカエネルギー機関

Oil and Gas Investor エネルギー市場情報

講演・セミナー実績

  • 講演会・セミナー・フォーラムなど実績
    講演会・セミナー・フォーラムなど実績 講演会: ①株式会社アマダ社 ②テレビ朝日 ③日本ビジネスコミュニケーション学会 ⑤全国信用金庫協会     ⑥愛知県経済同友会主     ⑦愛知県半田市役所     ⑧愛知県常滑市役所    

OPEC 石油輸出国機構

JICA院生訪問

  • 198 2011 6-10 JICA 横浜 訪問
    2011 6-11 JICA 横浜 訪問講義と見学

AngloAmerican アングロアメリカン (資源メジャー)

職業訓練(貿易英語・貿易実務)のページ 2014 大学院貿易講座

  • 厚生労働省東京、神奈川労働局の実施する職業訓練 (数少ない貿易分野の仕事志望者を支える技術訓練) 貿易分野の業務は、これまで経験重視のキャリアプランが中心だったが、IT化が税関NACCS他用いられ、またグローバル化により様相が変わってきている。特にモノからサービスへの貿易転換で、取引仕組みや、ドキュメント作成のディスシプリンもファイナンス取引に移行している。 (2013年度訓練生の皆さんと)

レアメタルリアルタイム市況チャート

レアアース市況動向

原油・石油製品市況

ウラン市況動向

米国政策提案リベラル系シンクタンク:ブルッキングズ研究所

戦略国際問題研究所CSIS

ロイター経済情報

  • ロイター経済情報
    CFDブログパーツCFD

経済チャート・市況情報

米国エネルギー株 市況

DowJones U.S.Market Atlas 米国企業情報データベース

中国ビジネスサポートサイト「Chinawork」

飯野海運株式会社

Frontline(フロントライン)

Energy Bulletin : Post carbon institute

旧外地産業・戦前石油関係資料室

パリOECD本部  forum 2011

  • 50asite
    OECDパリ本部 12/6-8 国際投資フォーラム出席 戦後最大の経済危機を迎えたEU経済は、それに依存するアフリカ、中南米、アジアの国々に多大な影響を与えている。米国主導のOECDが、この難局に政策提案する。

Dubai

  • DUBAI_599
    2011 12./10 ドバイ 国際貿易(ワールドトレード)センター 訪問

石炭大国旧東欧ポーランド訪問

  • 日本CCT技術にエネルギーのトレードオフ関係の可能性
    石炭王国ポーランドと日本のCCT技術:炭鉱の町訪問記2009 CCTクリーン・コール・テクノロジーでは先進技術を持つ日本技術の提供とポーランドの二酸化炭素排出権を供給するというトレードオフの関係強化のため、近年、政府もアプローチをおこなっている
FX 口座開設

gogo.gs
無料ブログはココログ

the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,一部著者掲載記事

Rare Earths: Changes in China’s Policies Prompt a Global Search for New Suppliers

“Rare earths” -- a group of elements from the periodic table that are vital for many high-tech industries -- are among the few natural resources that China has in relative abundance. Beijing’s unexpected decision in September 2010 to tighten controls on exports of China’s rare earths, which account for 97% of global supplies, have left the country’s trading partners, especially Japan, in a quandary.

Beijing insists that the newly imposed controls are meant to protect the environment and ensure sustainable use of its resources. Major consuming nations are relying heavily on China as a source of the 17 mineral elements and alloys critical to producing high tech goods such as hybrid cars, wind turbines, guided missiles and iPads. Japan, the biggest user of the materials, is generally reluctant to engage in confrontation with its neighbor and biggest trading partner, but its own manufacturers have been desperate. When the U.S. and EU decided this spring to pursue a complaint against China over its rare earths policies at the WTO, Tokyo was all too willing to join in.

The WTO complaint accuses China of manipulating rare earths prices by keeping them low for domestic use while raising them for exports, in a bid to force foreign companies to move their operations to China. “We want our companies building those products right here in America,” said U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House when announcing the case. “But to do that, American manufacturers need to have access to rare earths materials which China supplies.”

China now runs the risk of seeing its major customers for rare earths turn elsewhere for their supplies, experts say. Its sudden halt of shipments for a few months in 2010 and export price gyrations in 2011 convinced the U.S., Australia and other countries to increase or resume rare earths production that they had abandoned during the years when China was acting as an unbeatably cheap supplier. “It is difficult to tell what China will learn from this experience [the rare earths case at the WTO],” says Edward Gresser, director of the think-tank ProgressiveEconomy, which is affiliated with the GlobalWorks Foundation in Washington, D.C. “China is rather vulnerable with regard to natural resources itself. The weapon it has used against others [natural resource embargos]is one that could be used against China,” says Gresser, who was an adviser to former U.S. trade representative Charlene Barshefsky.

An Unfair Burden?

China has responded to the WTO case by arguing that its policies are necessary to protect the healthy development of the rare earths mining and processing industry and to preserve its own national strategic interests. The Ministry of Commerce said it is prepared to respond to the WTO complaint, insisting Beijing only aims to protect China’s resources and the environment, not to create trade distortions. “Despite huge environment pressures, China has made efforts to maintain a certain level of exports,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin.

Put another way, China is arguing that it is carrying an unfairly heavy burden in supplying rare earths, by providing 97% of the materials consumed while holding 50% of global reserves. It is “unfair” that the U.S. and other major consuming nations are not urging other countries to supply more rare earths to them, Xiang Songcuo, chief economist at the Agricultural Bank of China, contended in a debate broadcast on March 26 by China Radio International, casting the issue in military-strategic terms. “Many Chinese people complain that rare earths are key elements for producing high-tech military weapons to contain China and reduce the ‘threat’ from China. To produce rare earths has a very harmful effect on the environment and labor conditions. It is only fair for China to put forward restrictions on rare earths exports,” Xiang said. “There is no rationale for the U.S., EU and Japan to complain.”

Despite their name, rare earths are actually not “rare” in the sense of being in short supply. According to the U.S. Geological Survey’s Mineral Summaries in 2012, China has the world’s largest reserves of rare earths materials, estimated at 55 million tons, followed by 13 million tons for the U.S.; 19 million tons in the Commonwealth of Independent States (the former Soviet Union); 3.1 million tons in India and 1.6 million tons in Australia. China produced 130,000 tons of the rare earths used in 2011, out of the world total output of 133,580 tons. The biggest concern is over the supply of dysprosium which is used as a magnet material in hybrid vehicles motors and in magnetic drives for computers. China is the main producer of dysprosium.

Based on U.S. Geological Survey data, the expert view is that there is no shortage of these materials, and known existing reserves will be sufficient for hundreds of years, Gresser says. The materials are also relatively easy to recycle, further aiding with conservation. Moreover, not all Chinese experts believe the status quo represents a threat to China’s strategic interests. Beijing is conflating limiting exports with limiting consumption, says John Gong, an economics professor at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing. “We may lose the case because the arguments based on conservation of natural resources [e.g., rare earths] and the environment do not justify tightening the export quota. There should be no difference [in price] between domestic users and exports,” Gong said.

In fact, China’s current predicament, if it can be called that, results directly from its earlier policies of seeking to crowd out other producing countries, says William Overholt, senior research fellow at the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard’s Kennedy School. China started rare earths mining only in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, its production had surpassed that of the U.S. thanks to its cheap labor costs and lax environmental rules -- rare earths minerals often are mixed with radioactive elements, so processing them can create low level radioactive wastes, apart from other environmental issues associated with mining and smelting. “The reason China is providing 97% of the supply is that they reduced prices so far as to bankrupt everyone else. And then, they raised their prices sharply. That kind of manipulation created a difficult situation for anybody else who needs the minerals,” he says. 

‘China Incoherent’

While the impact of China’s recent restrictions on exports is clear, Beijing’s own ability to exert control over rare earths mining and production is less certain, says Scott Kennedy, director of the Research Center for Chinese Politics and Business at Indiana University. As is true for many industries in China, local governments and vested interests have distorted and nullified efforts by the central government to coordinate policies and impose control. “China Inc. ought to stand for ‘China Incoherent.’ China now dominates global rare earths mining, but internal dissension means that Beijing will not be able to exploit this advantage,” noted a research report titled, “Rocky Road for China Inc(coherent),” written by Kennedy for GK Dragonomics, a research firm based in Beijing. Premier Wen Jiabao, a geologist by training, has played a key role in setting rare earths policy, but working-level responsibility is spread among four government agencies: Ministry of Land and Resources, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

All the same, Beijing now is better able to impose a common policy on the vast majority of exports with the recent establishment of an industry association including four major producers that control 60% of total output. “For the purposes of the WTO ruling, the important thing is that if the central government wants to coordinate with the four government agencies and major rare earths producers, it can obviously do so,” Overholt says. Despite the difficulties so far in bringing independent miners, processors and traders under control, if the central authorities make rare earths a high priority, “local governments will not play games with this,” Gresser adds.

China started out reducing its rare earths export quota with the aim of gaining control over the industry. In July 2010, it suddenly issued a notice that the total export quota would be reduced by 72% in the second half of 2010 from the same period a year earlier, to 7,976 tons. As a result, the total export quota for 2010 was 30,258 tons, down 40% from 50,145 tons in 2009. China announced in December 2011 that its export quota for 2012 was set at 31,130 tons, raising it slightly under international pressure from the 30,184 quota of 2011.

A Weapon against Japan

Experts are divided over whether China will use control over rare earths as a diplomatic weapon, as it apparently did toward Japan in 2010. In September of that year, China suddenly halted shipments of rare earths without any advance notice to Japan, the U.S. or the EU. Many observers speculate that China’s embargo boycott of rare earths shipments to Japan, which officials never acknowledged formally, was diplomatic fallout from the collision of a Chinese patrol ship and Japanese fishing vessel near disputed islands in the East China Sea. While the embargoes to the U.S. and EU lasted 10 days, the ban on shipments to Japan persisted for more than two months. The message was conveyed obliquely through Chinese Commerce Minster Chen Deming, who asserted that the government had not imposed any restrictions on rare earth shipment to Japan, though he said Chinese companies might have done so on their own because of the sentiment toward Japan.

In late November, the New York Times reported that Chinese regulators had summoned the heads of Chinese rare earths companies to a secret meeting in Beijing and informed them the Chinese government was about to halt all shipments of rare earths to Japan. Any companies that increased shipments to a third country as a way to get around the embargo would lose its export license, the Times reported, citinga person with a detailed knowledge of the meeting, who insisted on anonymity to avoid angering Chinese officials.

China subsequently tightened controls on the rare earths industry, raising export prices in June 2011 and announcing a major consolidation plan for the industry. As a result, cerium peaked at US$150 per kg in August 2011, though it now sells at around US$30 per kg.

It is unclear how Chinese government officials evaluated the tactic of targeting Japan in this way and how they evaluated Japan’s reaction. “But when a country feels it has a source of power, it is more likely to use it at a moment of tension. It would be surprising if it did not happen,” Gresser points out. Konosuke Takegami, a professor at Takushoku University’s Graduate School of Commerce, predicts that China would lean toward using such a strategy if relations deteriorate again due to territorial or other disputes. “China may take a soft stance toward Japan in normal times, but it would take very strong measures [concerning rare earths] when it feels it is urgent to do,” Takegami says.

The WTO Case

Inevitably, China’s maneuvers have put pressure on major rare earths users either to find alternative supplies or to move operations to China. Hitachi Metals, a major magnet maker, is considering moving production of its neodymium magnets to China and the U.S., where miners are preparing to restart production after a 10-year hiatus. Showa Denko KK, a top Japanese rare earths alloy producer, announced last year that it would boost output at its Chinese joint venture by 50% to 3,000 tons a year, a move which reportedly angered the Japan trade ministry. Shin-Etsu Chemical said in January that it would build a rare earths recycling plant in Vietnam, in lieu of upgrading its domestic plants

Who will win the WTO case? The three plaintiffs waited until recently to file the complaint after seeing how another raw materials case against China fared. In January, a World Trade Organization panel ruled against China’s policy of limiting the export of raw materials used in the steel and chemicals industry. That decision may have provided the U.S. and Europe with ammunition in the rare earths case. In the earlier decision, the WTO panel confirmed that China’s export duties and export quotas on raw materials violated global trade rules and had to be changed. The EU and Mexico had joined the U.S. in the case, which was filed in 2009, arguing that China’s policies on exports of several raw materials such as bauxite, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal and zinc gave Chinese companies an unfair advantage because they are sold at low prices in the domestic market but at higher prices for export. “They filed previous petitions on other raw materials and they wanted to see how they played out. When that case went through all of appeals and came to a clear resolution, they felt that they had precedent to go forward,” says Patrick Chovanec, a professor of economics and management at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

Chovanec believes U.S. trade officials may have wanted a little bit of lead time to see how China would react to that first WTO ruling and whether it might affect Chinese policy on rare earths. When there was no sign it was having an impact, the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) decided to proceed, he adds. “Having won the raw materials case, now there is some legal history and some basis for the USTR people to judge whether they might win if they file a case dealing with rare earths,” says Gresser. “If you file a case with no real legal history on such a high priority issue, you have to be careful. If you lose, then there will be a legal precedent, which will make it difficult to win any such cases.”

As the WTO mulls the merits of the case, the dispute is altering the rare earths industry landscape. The U.S., Australia and other countries have restarted rare earths output or increased production, while major importers like Japan have begun to diversify their supply chains. Colorado-based Molycorp expects output at the mine to reach its Phase 1 annual rate of 19,050 tons by the end of the third quarter. A second phase plant is expected to add another 20,000 tons of capacity by 2013. Lynas of Australia expects its first rare earths output by late 2012 with capacity initially at 11,000 tons a year.

The U.S. Department of Energy forecasts in a research report, titled “Critical Materials Strategy,” that as output from mines coming online adds up, total world annual production of rare earths will rise to 200,000 tons by 2015, up from the current 133,580 tons. The U.S., Australia, Vietnam, India, Russia, Kazakhstan and South Africa all have further production potential. Since supply disruptions began in 2010, Japan’s dependence on China for rare earths has fallen to 80% from over 90% as it has diversified its supply base to include countries like Malaysia, India and Mongolia.

Even while appealing to the WTO, most countries will continue to seek alternatives to China, and not just because of potential future troubles with its export policies. Market dynamics are likely to further erode China’s quasi-monopoly. “China may have a dominant position based upon price, but when its reliability came into question, people started looking for other sources, even those that cost more. The search has been going on for more than a year now and some of the mines are coming online,” says Chovanec. “Is the WTO petition going to change things? Not as much as market dynamics.The market dynamics are already changing.”

Among other reasons, China is more vulnerable in terms of access to natural resources than the U.S. China is one of the world’s biggest importers of crude oil, iron ore and other natural resources, notes Gresser. Under the best-case scenario, consultations over the WTO case may help China and its trading partners resolve some of these tensions over rare earths resources and the technologies that use them. A less optimistic scenario could involve escalating frictions over those and other resources -- an undesirable outcome for all concerned. “Ultimately, China is quite at risk of natural resources embargoes, largely due to its massive demand for energy,” Gresser notes.

Published : 2012.04.25

http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=article&articleid=2582&l=5&&&languageid=1

Penn_2

中国调整稀土政策,全球客户四处寻求新供应商

“稀土”是元素周期表上的一组元素,对很多高科技行业至关重要,也是中国储量相对丰富的自然资源之一。由于中国的稀土出口量占全球供应量的97%,因此北京方面在2010年9月突然宣布加强稀土出口控制的决定,令很多贸易伙伴、特别是日本陷入困境。

北京方面坚称,此举意在保护环境,保证资源的可持续利用。绝大多数稀土消费国都严重依赖中国提供这17种矿物元素或合金,用于生产混合动力汽车、风力涡轮机、导弹以及iPad等高科技产品。日本作为这些材料的最大消费国,一般不愿与这个邻国和最大的贸易伙伴正面对抗。但日本国内的生产商却感到相当绝望。因此,当美欧在今年春天决定就中国稀土政策向世贸组织提起诉讼时,东京方面也迫不及待地加入了进来。

在向世贸组织的控诉中,各方指责中国操纵稀土价格,在国内维持低价,而出口时却提高价格,从而迫使国外企业将业务转移到中国。“我们希望我们的公司能够在美国生产这些产品,”美国总统奥巴马在白宫提到此案时这样说道。“但要这样做,美国制造商就需要从中国获得稀土原材料。”

专家表示,中国目前面临的风险就是稀土大客户纷纷转向别处寻求供应源。2010年,中国突然停止稀土出口运输长达数月之久。2011年的稀土出口价格又处于漩涡之中。这些原因促使美国、澳大利亚和其他国家不得不增加本土的稀土产量,甚至恢复了中断多年的稀土生产(中国曾经是无可匹敌的低价供应商)。“很难讲中国从这一次的经验(世贸组织的稀土诉讼案)中学到了什么。”智库机构进步经济项目部(ProgressiveEconomy)主任爱德华·格雷瑟(Edward Gresser)这样说道。该机构隶属于华盛顿全球公共事业基金会(GlobalWorks Foundation)。格雷瑟曾任美国前任贸易代表查伦·巴尔舍夫斯基(Charlene Barshefsky)的顾问。他说:“中国的自然资源本身来讲非常脆弱。他们用来针对其他人的武器(自然资源禁运)也可以被其他人反过来用来针对他们。”

不公正的负担?

中国对世贸组织的诉讼案回应称,其政策是保护稀土矿开采和加工行业健康发展的必要措施,也是为了维护本国战略利益。商务部表示,中国已经为世贸组织的诉讼案作好了应诉准备,并坚称北京方面的目的只是为了保护中国的自然资源与环境,而不是引起贸易混乱。外交部发言人刘为民说:“尽管承受着巨大的环境压力,中国依然在努力保持一定的出口量。”

换而言之,中国是在主张自己在稀土供应方面承受了不公正的沉重负担。中国稀土储量占全球的50%,但却提供了97%的原材料。3月26日,中国农业银行首席经济学家向松祚在由中国国际广播电台举办的一场广播辩论节目中坚称,美国和其他稀土消耗大国并没有敦促其他国家供应更多稀土,这是“不公平的”。他把这个问题与军事战略联系在一起。“很多中国人抱怨说,稀土是制造高科技军事武器的关键原料,从而达到限制中国、减少来自中国‘威胁’的目的。为了开采稀土,对环境造成了非常有害的影响,工作条件也很恶劣。中国只有加强对稀土出口的限制才是公平之举。” 向松祚说道。“美国、欧盟和日本的抱怨毫无理由。”

尽管稀土名为“稀”土,但实际上它们的供应量却并不稀少。根据美国地质调查局的《2012年矿物情况小结》,中国的稀土储备量为世界之最,约为5500万吨;其次是美国,1300万吨;独联体国家(前苏联),总共1900万吨;印度,310万吨;以及澳大利亚,160万吨。中国2011年的稀土产量为13万吨。当年全球总产量为13.358万吨。最受关注的是镝的供应情况。这种元素被用作制造混合动力汽车的磁体材料以及电脑的磁力驱动器。中国是主要的镝生产国。

格雷瑟说,根据美国地质调查局的数据,专家的观点是这些原材料并不短缺,已知储备足以开采数百年。这些材料重新利用起来也相对比较容易,是对储备的进一步补充。除此之外,并非所有中国专家都认为目前的情况是对中国战略利益的一种威胁。对外经济贸易大学的经济学副教授龚炯表示,北京方面不仅限制出口,也限制消费。他说:“我们可能会败诉。因为我们的理由是以自然资源(例如稀土)和环境保护为依据的。但这不能证明收紧出口配额就是合理的。国内用户和出口之间(在价格上)应该并无差别。”

哈佛大学肯尼迪学院ASH民主治理与创新中心高级研究员威廉·奥弗霍尔特(William Overholt)指出,事实上,中国目前处境尴尬(如果可以这样说的话)的直接原因是其早前企图排挤其他稀土出产国的政策。中国直到20世纪80年代才开始开采稀土矿。截至20世纪90年代中期,其稀土产量已经超过美国。这缘于其低廉的劳动力成本和宽松的环境法规。稀土矿往往与放射性元素混杂在一起,因此加工过程中会产生低浓度的放射性废物。此外还会引发很多与采矿和冶炼相关的环境问题。奥弗霍尔特说:“中国之所以能够提供97%的稀土供应量,是因为他们把价格压到很低,以至于其他人纷纷破产。然后,他们又大幅提高了价格。这种操纵令其他需要这些矿产品的人无所适从。”

中国表里不一

印第安纳大学中国政治与商业研究中心主任斯科特·肯尼迪(Scott Kennedy)指出,虽然中国近期限制出口的影响很明显,但北京方面是否有能力对稀土矿开采和生产实施管控,还是未知数。在中国的很多行业确实存在这种情况:地方政府和相互抱团的利益团体经常曲解中央政府协调政策和实施控制的工作,甚至令这一努力付之东流。一份研究报告以“中国表里不一道路坎坷”为题,指出“中国公司(China Inc.)可以解释为‘中国表里不如一公司’(China Incoherent)。中国目前把持着全球稀土矿的开采,但内部分歧意味着北京并没有能力利用好这一优势。”这份报告是肯尼迪为北京的一家研究公司GK Dragonomics撰写的。地质专业毕业的中国总理温家宝在制定稀土政策上起到了关键作用。但工作层面的职责却分别落在了四家政府机构肩上:国土资源部、国家发改委、商务部以及工信部。

但是无论如何,北京方面现在更容易针对绝大部分出口实施统一的政策。因为就在不久前,一家包含了四大主要稀土生产商的行业协会建立,总共控制着稀土产量的60%。奥弗霍尔特说:“为了执行世贸组织的判决,重要的是如果中央政府希望与四个部门以及主要的稀土生产商协调,显然它是可以这样做的。”尽管目前将私营矿产商、加工商以及贸易商纳入控制之下还有难度,但如果中央政府将稀土作为一项优先工作,“地方政府也不会不配合他们。” 奥弗霍尔特说道。

中国已经开始减少稀土出口配额,从而获得对这个行业的控制权。2010年7月,中国突然发出通知,将当年下半年的出口配额减少至7,976吨,比去年同期减少72%。结果,2010年的总出口配额仅为30,258吨,比2009年的50,145吨减少40%。2011年12月,中国宣布2012年的出口配额定在31,130吨。在国际压力之下,这一数额比2011年的30,184吨略有提高。

针对日本的武器

对于中国是否会将控制稀土作为一件外交武器,专家的意见有所分歧。但是在2010年,中国确实对日本采取了这种手段。当年9月,中国突然在没有提前通知日本、美国或者欧盟的情况下中止了稀土出口。很多观察家猜测,中国禁止向日本出口稀土一事尽管官方从未正式承认,但却是一起外交事件所导致的后果。在中国东海的争议岛屿附近,一艘中国渔船遭日本巡逻艇冲撞。中国对美国和欧盟的禁运持续了10天,但对日本的禁运则持续了两个多月。这一信息由中国商务部长陈德铭几经辗转才得以传达。他证实政府没有向对日稀土运输实施任何限制措施,但他表示中国公司很可能因为对日本抱有情绪而这样做。

去年11月,《纽约时报》报告称,中国监管机构召集国内稀土公司领导在北京秘密开会,传达中国政府即将停止所有对日本的稀土运输。《纽约时报》援引一位了解会议详情人士的话报道称,任何公司如果企图通过增加向第三国的出口量来作为绕过禁运的一种手段,则将失去出口牌照。这位人士坚持隐去姓名,以避免触怒中国官员。

中国随后收紧了对稀土产业的控制,自2011年6月起提高了出口价格,并宣布了一项重大的行业合并计划。于是,2011年8月的铈价格攀升至150美元/公斤。不过目前其售价约为30美元/公斤。

目前还不清楚中国政府官员如何评价以这种方式针对日本,以及如何评价日本的反应。格雷瑟指出:“但是当一个国家感到自己有了权力的时候,就很容易在关系紧张的时期利用这种权力。如果不这样做反而令人惊讶。”日本拓殖大学商务研究生院教授Konosuke Takegami预计,如果双边关系因为领土或其他争端再度恶化,中国很可能再次利用这种战略。他说:“中国可能在正常时期对日本采取软立场,但是一旦感到自己有必要这么做,则可能(在稀土方面)采取非常强硬的手段。”

世贸组织诉讼案

不可避免的,中国的做法给很多主要稀土消费国施加了巨大压力。他们或者要找到替代供应商,或者要将业务移到中国。Hitachi Metals公司是一家大型磁铁制造商。他们正在考虑将钕磁铁生产业务转移到中国和美国。在美国,一些矿产公司在经过10年的中断后正在筹备重新开始稀土生产。日本主要的稀土合金制造商Showa Denko KK去年宣布,将把中国合资公司的产量提高50%,达到每年3,000吨。据称此举激怒了日本商贸部。Shin-Etsu Chemical公司也在1月表示,将在越南建立一家稀土回收厂,而不是对国内工厂进行升级。

谁能赢得世贸组织的诉讼案?三原告之所以等到最近才提起诉讼,是因为他们一直在观察另一起针对中国的原材料诉讼案的结果。1月份,世贸组织专家组针对中国限制钢材和化工品原材料出口一案判决中国败诉。该决定很可能给美欧提供了赢得稀土诉讼案胜利的依据。在较早期的判决中,世贸组织专家组认定中国的原材料出口税和出口配额违反了全球贸易规则,必须更改。欧盟和墨西哥在这一项于2009年提起的诉讼案中加入了美国的阵营,宣称中国的多项原材料出口政策,比如铝、镁、锰、碳化硅、硅和锌,都令中国企业享受到不公平的优势,因为它们在国内市场的售价很低,而出口价格则要高得多。清华大学经济管理学院副教授帕特里克·霍瓦内茨(Patrick Chovanec)说:“他们此前也曾针对其他原材料提起请求,并希望看到结果如何。当案件经过层层上诉、最终得到明确判决的时候,他们感到有了先例可循。”

霍瓦内茨相信,美国贸易官员很可能希望打一个提前量,以便观察中国对世贸组织的前一个判决作何反应,以及是否会影响中国的稀土政策。但是,由于没有迹象显示判决造成了任何影响,美国贸易代表办公室就决定继续起诉。“赢得了原材料诉讼案,现在就有了法律先例,为美国贸易代表办公室的人判断他们是否能够赢得稀土案奠定了一定基础。”格雷瑟说道。“如果你就如此重要的问题提起诉讼,但又没有法律先例,就不得不小心了。如果你输了,这就会变成法律先例,以后的同类诉讼想赢就很难。”

在世贸组织掂量本案是非曲直的同时,争端已然改变了稀土行业的面貌。美国、澳大利亚和其他一些国家已经重新开始生产稀土,或者提高了稀土产量。而一些主要的进口国,比如日本,则开始对供应链实施多样化调整。科罗拉多州的Molycorp公司预测,截至三季度末,稀土的产量就能达到第一阶段19,050吨的年产量。第二阶段的计划是在2013年之前将产量再提升20,000吨。澳大利亚Lynas公司则预计在2012年年底之前收获自己的首批稀土,产量初步达到每年11,000吨。

美国能源部在一份名为“重点原材料战略”的报告中预测,未来所有新增稀土矿的产量加在一起,全球稀土年产量将在2015年之前达到20万吨,高于目前的13.358万吨。美国、澳大利亚、越南、印度、俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦以及南非都有进一步扩大生产的潜力。由于供应纷争出现于2010年,日本对中国的稀土依赖程度已经从90%以上减少至80%,主要是通过供应地多样化的手段,包括马来西亚、印度和蒙古。

即便是在向世贸组织提起诉讼的同时,绝大多数国家仍会继续寻求中国的替代者。而这并不仅仅是因为中国的出口政策可能在今后制造麻烦。市场动态很可能进一步蚕食中国的“准独裁”地位。“中国可能会凭借价格占据主导地位,但是一旦可靠性成了问题,人们便会寻求其他供应源,即便这样的代价要更大。这种寻找一直在进行,已经有一年多之久了。一些锡矿正在加入进来。” 霍瓦内茨说道。“向世贸组织提交申请能否改变这些情况?其效果并不会好于市场动态。市场动态已经发生改变了。”

且不论其他原因,中国在获取自然资源方面比美国还要不堪一击。中国是世界上最大的原油、铁矿石以及其他自然资源进口国之一,格雷瑟指出。最好的情形是,就世贸组织诉讼案的咨询有助于中国和贸易伙伴在一定程度上缓和针对稀土资源及其利用技术问题的紧张关系。较不乐观的情形可能是在这样或那样资源上的摩擦升级。这是所有当事方都不乐于看到的结果。格雷瑟说:“归根结底,中国的自然资源禁运确实是一步险棋,很大程度上在于它对能源的需求实在是太大了。”


发布日期 : 2012.04.25

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